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DEVELOPING, TESTING, AND MARKETING AN AIDS VACCINE:
LEGAL CONCERNS FOR MANUFACTURERS
ALISON JOY ARNOLDt
INTRODUCTION
Due to the lack of a national policy for dealing with the AIDS1
pandemic, individuals within AIDS high risk groups are rapidly
becoming society's new health advocates. Occasionally employing
confrontational tactics, 2 these individuals are attempting to
t A.B. 1982, Brown University; M.A. 1988, Wesleyan University;J.D. Candidate
1991, University of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to my family, in
appreciation for their support and encouragement, and to my former colleagues in
the pharmaceutical industry who remain undaunted by the obstacles. I am grateful
to Scott Burris for his comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
1 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a communicable and sexually
transmitted disease caused by the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV). It is the
final phase in a continuum characterized by four distinct disease stages: first, an
initial infection which often mimics mononucleosis; second, a period of latent,
asymptomatic infection; third, persistent, regionalized lymph node enlargement
sometimes called AIDS-related Complex (ARC); and finally, the multiple opportunistic
infections, neurological impairments, and other clinical presentations that constitute
AIDS. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Classification System for Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus Infection, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 234, 234-35 (1986).
The HIV virus is a retrovirus; it uses an enzyme called reverse transcriptase to
introduce its genetic material (ribonucleic acid, or RNA) into the genetic material
(deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA) of a host cell. Initially, the virus is virtually
undetectable. Seropositivity (the appearance of viral antibody in the serum) occurs
when the altered host cell is properly stimulated by antigens. At that point, the
infected host cell's replicatory machinery "sees" both the foreign viral material, as well
as its own cellular DNA, and thus produces infected cells. Viral proteins are then
synthesized and are subsequently packaged together with viral genome and released,
going on to attack additional cells. HIV has a predilection for particular host cell
types, namely, T-helper lymphocytes (also called T-4 cells), macrophages, and
monocytes. Since the T-helper lymphocytes are responsible for cell-mediated
immunity, their destruction by the virus is a critical cellular event in the development
of the disease, causing the immunodeficiency which gives AIDS its name. See Fauci,
Temin & Martin, The Scientific Agenda for AIDS, ISSUES ScI. & TEcH., Winter 1988,
at 33, 33-35; Mayer, The Clinical Challenges of AIDS and HIV Infection, 14 LAw, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 281 (1986); Schild & Minor, Human Immunodeficiency Virus and AIDS:
Challenges and Progress, 335 LANCET 1081, 1081-82 (1990).
2 For example, Larry Kramer is the founder of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash
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galvanize those within the research, regulatory, and pharmaceutical
communities to provide access to AIDS drugs through special
distribution programs, and to accelerate AIDS drug and vaccine
development.3 If these goals are to be realized, a radical change in
the approach taken toward the research, approval, and marketing of
new drugs may be required. Speeding up the drug approval process
may mean the utilization of patients in high-risk clinical experimen-
tation. Moreover, drug availability and pricing policies may depend
on the ability of manufacturers to limit their own liability. The
consequences of these issues extend beyond the AIDS epidemic and
influence the extent to which the drug development process will be
able to respond to disease victims in the future.
As scientific progress towards an AIDS vaccine 4 begins to
generate significant media attention and public interest, it is
important to remain aware of the obstacles present in developing a
successful vaccine for the prevention of AIDS. Part I of this
Comment provides a brief overview of pharmaceutical product
development and oversight of this process within the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA). Part II analyzes the dilemma the manufac-
turers face when using human subjects in vaccine testing. Part III
discusses liability risks for potential AIDS vaccine manufacturers.5
Power (ACT UP). He has described the tactics used by the coalition:
We have protests, which include taking over the opening plenary session of
the AIDS conference in Montreal, blocking the Golden Gate Bridge and
protesting endlessly at city hall here in New York. We have telephone zaps
where we tie up switchboards. We purchased millions of dollars of tickets
when Northwest Airlines refused to carry AIDS people as passengers, tickets
that weren't paid for, of course.
Simpson, UsingRage to Fight the Plague, TIME, Feb. 5, 1990, at 7 (providing additional
accounts of confrontational tactic; employed by ACT UP).
3 See Marsa, Phoenix Rising OMNI, Dec. 1989, at 51, 54-58.
4 Vaccination is a method of inducing immunity by the injection of a suspension
of attenuated or killed microorganisms, including viruses.
The classic approach to developing a vaccine is to devise an immunogen
that invokes an immune response [including antibody production] that can
prevent absolutely the initial infection .... Some vaccines may be initially
infected with a wild-type micro-organism; however, because of vaccine-
induced immunity, the person may develop only a subclinical infection.
Thus, a vaccine may also be designed to prevent the development of disease
once the person is infected. Lastly, once disease is present, [some vaccines]
may be used to bolster immunity and prevent the progression of disease.
Fauci, Gallo, Koenig, Salk & Purcell, Development and Evaluation of a Vaccine for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 373, 373
(1989) [hereinafter Development] (footnote omitted).
5 See infra text following note 68.
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These risks are complicated by the courts' failure to establish a
uniform way to evaluate high-risk therapeutic products, thereby
making it difficult for manufacturers to determine whether they will
be immune from strict liability claims. 6 Part IV discusses possible
future solutions for removing the legal barriers to AIDS vaccine
development. And finally, this Comment concludes that the
successful development and distribution of an AIDS vaccine
requires a united effort among manufacturers, lawmakers, and
regulators. A safe and effective vaccine can reach the marketplace
only if legal obstacles are removed.
As legal strategies are developed to deal with an AIDS vaccine,
it must be remembered that bringing this product through develop-
ment will not be an easy task. Researchers and regulators will have
to work overtime, and the obstacles they face should not be
discounted.
I. FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE MARKETPLACE: AN OVERVIEW OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
To appreciate fully the concerns surrounding the licensing of
new vaccines, it is necessary to understand the federal administra-
tive process by which pharmaceutical products move from the
laboratory to the marketplace. The following discussion will provide
a brief overview of this process.
Pursuant to its statutory mandate under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),7 the FDA has promulgated both
procedural and substantive regulations for the approval of all drug
products. 8  Vaccines fall within a category of drugs known as
6 See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
7 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988).
8 A "drug" is considered to be any article "intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease," or any non-food article intended
structurally or functionally to affect the body. 21 U.S.C. § 32 1 (g) (1988).
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA has the authority "to
act as both a public health promoter, by facilitating the approval of important new
safe and effective therapies, and as a public health protector, by keeping offor taking
off the market drugs not shown to meet safety and efficacy standards." 50 Fed. Reg.
7452,7452 (1985). The Supreme Court has endorsed the FDA's regulatory authority.
See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Ciba Corp.
v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412
U.S. 645 (1973); USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973).
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biologics, 9 and are subject to licensing provisions under the Public
Health Service Act,10 in addition to FDA drug regulation.
Once the obstacles of preclinical development n have been
9 "'Biological product' means any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or
analogous product applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or
injuries of man." 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h) (1990).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (1988). The process of licensure is overseen by the Office
of Biologics Research and Review, Center for Drugs and Biologics of the FDA. The
goal of licensure is to ensure that manufacturing facilities and biologic products
"meet standards, designed to insure the continued safety, purity, and potency of such
products .... " 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1988); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-52 (1988).
The FDA routinely inspects manufacturing facilities, and is empowered to
examine individual vaccine lots in order to ensure compliance with FDA-approved
standards for manufacturing and testing. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 600.20, 610.1-.2 (1990);
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,546-47 (1988) (noting that the discretionary
nature of FDA vaccine-lot testing does not bar a negligence action for the FDA's
failure to ensure regulatory compliance).
1 A number of biomedical factors have complicated efforts to develop an effective
AIDS vaccine. First, the usual methods of vaccine development depend on the use
of either attenuated virus or inactivated virus. In AIDS research, however, attenuated
virus is thought to pose the risk of latent infection, and inactivated virus has had
varying results in animal models. See Ada, Prospects for a Vaccine Against HIV, 339
NATURE 331 (1989); Liew, New Aspects of Vaccine Developmen 62 CLINICAL & ExPERI-
MENTAL IMMUNOLOGY 225 (1985); Developmen supra note 4, at 379 (edited summary
of a conference sponsored by the National Institutes of Health).
Second, although a purified HIV subunit (such as a protein from the viral
envelope) might be sufficient to generate an immune response, choosing a suitable
subunit may pose a number of difficulties. For example, a successful HIV vaccine
must perform two separate functions: it must induce the formation of antibodies and
also neutralize the infected cells before they reproduce. See Ada, supra, at 331
(stating that "the vaccine should induce antibodies that neutralize viral infectivity as
well as cytotoxic T lymphocytes").
Third, there are multiple strains of the HIV virus, and therefore, any vaccine
developed must be able to protect against all strains and do so for a substantial
period of time. See Hahn, Shaw, Taylor, Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Wong-Staal,
Gallo, Parks & Parks, Genetic Variation in HTLV-Ill/LA V Over Time in Patients with
AIDS or at Risk for AIDS, 232 Sci. 1548 (1986).
Finally, both the identification of viable animal models in which to study the
disease, and the use of chimpanzees as one such model, have been hampered by
several factors. Chimpanzees are an endangered species, expensive, and their use has
generated particular concern among animal rights activists. For an overview of the
debate concerning the general use of animals in biomedical research, see Cohen, The
Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 865 (1986);
Sumner, Animal Welfare and Animal Rights, 13J. MED. & PHIL. 159 (1988); Transforma-
tion of Society's Beliefs is Goal of Animal Rights Movemen 29 PHYSIOLOGIST 43 (1986)
(presentation by William M. Samuels before the Physiology Society).
Until recently, it appeared that the immune responses of chimpanzees challenged
with HIV were such that the animals could not be considered suitable for vaccine
testing. This no longer appears to be true, and "any AIDS vaccine effort [will
probably] pause to consider how the product perform[s] in animals." Garrett, The
Leap to Possibility; Progress Prompts Vew Optimismfor an HIV Vaccine Newsday, June 10,
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overcome and a promising new drug has been identified, and has
successfully undergone toxicological testing in animals, the
pharmaceutical manufacturer files a "Notice of Claimed Investiga-
tional Exemption for a New Drug (IND)" with the FDA. 12 This
signals the company's intention to begin clinical testing of the new
product, and also begins the FDA's review process.' 3 Following
IND submission, the FDA has thirty days to evaluate the application
and determine whether safety problems exist.14 If safety require-
ments are met, clinical testing in human subjects can begin.
15
Clinical testing in human subjects is conducted in four phases,
three of which occur prior to approval for generalized usage and
marketing of the product.16 The first of these phases is consid-
1990, at 5.
Although early pessimism is receding, technical problems continue to retard
progress in designing a vaccine that will provide either immunity or a more favorable
long term clinical experience for those immunized.
12 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1990).
13 Until recently, the FDA was the only regulatory body to grant an investigational
exemption, d 6 ing so only after determining that a drug's potential benefits justified
human testing. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 312.1 (1990).
California has now adopted legislation that will encourage clinical testing of new
drugs prior to FDA authorization by providing funding to manufacturers believed to
have "a good chance of developing an FDA approved vaccine...." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.59(b) (West 1990).
14 "Approval [of the IND] ... is not an affirmative approval but is merely the
absence of an objection registered within the mandatory 30-day waiting period."
Halperin, Research on New Drugs: Balancing the Goals, 1 CLINICAL REs. PRAC. & DRUG
REG. AFF. 325, 332 (1983). Thus, IND approval does not predict FDA endorsement
during subsequent steps in the review process. See id.
15 Federal regulations require researchers to obtain the informed consent of
subjects before commencing clinical testing. See infra text accompanying notes 53-67
(discussing informed consent).
16 These phases are as follows:
Phase I: The first phase of human testing is directed at determining
the safe dosage range for a drug, the ways it is absorbed into the body, and
possible levels of toxicity. These tests are usually conducted on 20-80
normal, healthy volunteers.
Phase II: The second phase of human testing is performed on closely
monitored patients to learn more about the drug's safety and effectiveness.
The number of patients monitored in this phase depends on the nature of
the drug but seldom is more than 200. Most Phase II testing is directed at
treatment or prevention of a specific disease. Additional animal testing is
usually undertaken to gain further safety information. If the tests show the
drug may be useful in treating a disease and the long-term animal testing
indicates no unwarranted harm, the sponsor [the pharmaceutical company]
then proceeds to phase III.
Phase III: This phase involves the most extensive testing. Phase III
studies are intended to assess the safety, effectiveness, and most desirable
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ered nontherapeutic, while the remaining three phases often
provide some therapeutic benefit to the participants.
17
Following the successful completion of Phase III, the pharma-
ceutical company submits a new drug application (NDA) for FDA
approval.' 8 The new product is given a chemical and therapeutic
classification and submitted to experts in the FDA review disci-
plines.1 9 The FDA then has 180 days to review the application.
20
Additional information may be requested from the pharmaceutical
company; hence, the total review period occasionally exceeds 180
days. Application approval is based, in principle, upon the
existence of a substantial body of evidence supporting the product's
effectiveness as well as the demonstrated safety of the product for
its intended use.21 "[T]his mandate necessitates an evaluation of
the relation between benefit and risk .... which in turn requires
evaluation of the relation between the pharmacologic effect of a
[product] and the benefit presumed to derive from this effect."
22
The FDA is permitted a certain amount of subjective judgment in
dosage of the drug in treating a specific disease in a large group of patients
(usually several hundred to several thousand, depending on the drug).
During Phase III, the drug is used the way it would be administered when
marketed. Additional testing intended to define more specifically any drug-
related adverse effects is also done in Phase II.
Myers & Moore, The Drug Approval Process and the Information It Provides, 21 DRUG
INTELL. & CLINICAL PHARMACY 821, 822 (1987); see also Needs for AIDS Research
Activities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 167 (1988) (Final report
from the AIDS Clinical Trial Advisory Group discussing the establishment and
operation of AIDS Treatment Evaluation Groups, developed to increase the clinical
trial network for new AIDS therapies); Flieger, Testing in 'Real People,' FDA
CONSUMER, Nov. 1987, at 11.
17 Consider the following:
Experimentation involving human research subjects has at least two
subcategories: therapeutic and nontherapeutic. Therapeutic experimenta-
tion using a human subject may be defined as that experimentation which
has as a goal providing a direct benefit (effective medical therapy) to the
subject-patient. In contrast, nontherapeutic experimentation is not directed
toward providing a benefit to the subject but is concerned with the
discovery of data through the research on the human subject.
Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d
1340 (4th Cir. 1987).
18 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1990).
19 See Myers & Moore, supra note 16, at 823.
20 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.100 (1990).
21 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b) (1990).
2 Borer, t-PA and the Principles of Drug Approva 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1659,
1659-60 (1987).
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its evaluation, and as a result conflict often surrounds the approval
process.
Once a pharmaceutical product has met FDA requirements and
has been granted approval, the manufacturing company may begin
marketing and sales.2" The company, however, is not out of the
FDA's jurisdiction. Experimental documentation continues to be
accumulated during Phase IV trials, 24 and the company is responsi-
ble for submitting this information to the FDA in scheduled annual
reports for the remaining life of the patent.25 Through its moni-
toring of the product's marketing experience, the FDA ensures that
unfavorable effects are minimized and that labeling reflects any
adverse reactions or contraindications.
26
Pharmaceutical product development is a long, tedious, and
expensive process. A recent survey estimated that development
time now averages twelve years, while costs average 231 million U.S.
dollars for each new product.27 Since the combined annual
revenues generated by all vaccines have fallen to between 200
million 28 and 547 million29 U.S. dollars in recent years, an AIDS
vaccine could easily take many years to show a profit for the
pharmaceutical company. Therapeutic liability,30 existing patent
23 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105 (1990).
24 The post-marketing, or Phase IV, clinical trials allow the measurement of
variables not adequately assessed during Phase III research. For instance, the
regimens and clinical situations studied during Phase III do not always correlate with
those in which the product will be utilized after marketing. Also, even the large
number of patients involved in Phase III trials are not fully representative of the
treatment population-rare yet serious side effects may not be perceived until after
marketing. In addition to monitoring safety issues, the pharmaceutical company
looks for possible new indications; that is, the discovery of secondary effects which
might permit use in a new population. Regulatory approval of such usage would
result in increased utilization and higher profits for the company. See Townsend,
PostmarketingDrugResearch and Development 21 DRUG INTELL. & CLINICAL PHARMACY
134, 134 (1987).
25 The manufacturer must continuously report any adverse reactions or
unexpected side effects "whether or not considered drug related .... " 21 C.F.R.
§ 310.305(b)(2)-(3) (1990). The FDA also reviews the scientific and medical literature
to gather evidence about drug hazards. See 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7473 (1985). Failure
by the manufacturer to provide experimental documentation "may be grounds ...
for suspending or withdrawing approval of the application." 21 C.F.R. § 310.303(a)
(1990).
26 See Myers & Moore, supra note 16, at 823.
27 See Rotman, The Price of Doing R & D Soars, CHEMICAL W., June 13, 1990, at
46 (noting a survey conducted at Tufts University).
28 See Garrett, supra note 11.
2 See Andrews, A MajorRevival in Research on Vaccines, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1990,
at D7, col. 1.
30 Dr. George Todaro, former president of Oncogen (a subsidiary of Bristol-Myers
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life,31 and the demographics of AIDS-infected individuals 3 2 are also
critical to a company's ability to recoup its initial investment and
show a profit. Combined., these factors will have a significant
impact on corporate incentives to invest in AIDS vaccine research
and development.
Squibb) noted that although Bristol-Myers Squibb "will continue searching for an
AIDS vaccine... concerns about liability force the company to abandon anything that
is not proven 100-percent effective." To that observation Dr.Jonas Salk, "father of
the polio vaccine," responded, "'[tihere is no one-hundred-percent safe and effective
vaccine.'" Garrett, The Waiting Game in AIDS Research: Giant Drug Companies Are
Watching the Little Guys in the Quest for a Vaccine, Newsday, Sept. 18, 1990, at 1, 5; see
also infra notes 68-157 and accompanying text.
s In 1984, Congress enacted legislation to address pharmaceutical manufacturers'
concern that the long FDA approval process was eroding their 17 year period of
market exclusivity (as granted under the federal patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1988)). The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act authorized
five year extensions for patents of any new drug product that retained a patent life
of less than 14 years following FDA approval. See Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585,
1599 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (1988)). For an analysis of this
legislation, see Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 433
(1986).
Recognizing that more innovative incentives may be required to spur manufac-
turer participation in the AIDS vaccine effort,
Harvard University's Dr.Jonathan Mann, former director of the Global
Program on AIDS, [has] proposed a patent-incentive program for vaccine
development. Under the Mann plan, a company that develops an AIDS
vaccine would donate patent rights to an international agency, such as WHO
[the World Health Organization]. In exchange, the company would receive
a transferable right to a 10-year international patent extension on its most
profitable, nonlifesaving drug, such as an acne cream.
Garrett, supra note 30, at 5.
32 As has been noted:
The demographics of who is getting AIDS is changing, shifting throughout
the world to poorer populations. Vaccine manufacturers know that within
10 years the major purchaser.,; of an AIDS vaccine will be the World Health
Organization [WHO] and governments, not individuals. And that means
... there will be strong pressure to keep costs low.
Garrett, supra note 11, at 5.
Further,
Dr. Roy Widdus of WHO's Global Program on AIDS said any vaccine that
costs more that $1 a person would be unaffordable.
When a hepatitis-B vaccine was developed in the United States, it cost
$100 a person. It took 15 years of international pressure to bring that cost
to $1 a person, Widdus said, 'and a lag time like that would be devastating
in the case of AIDS.'
Garrett, supra note 30, at 5.
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II. DILEMMAS FOR MANUFACTURERS DURING CLINICAL
DEVELOPMENT: THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
IN AIDS VACCINE TESTING
The technical hurdles associated with preclinical vaccine
development have not impeded all progress toward an available HIV
vaccine. Preliminary human trials with a vaccine produced by
MicroGeneSys, Inc. began in September of 1987, 3 and since that
time, testing of additional vaccine candidates has been proceeding
in the United States and abroad.3 4 As the development of an
AIDS vaccine moves through the various phases of human testing,
manufacturers will be attempting to design clinical protocols that
favorably balance harms and benefits to participants. In so doing
they will face two challenges: (1) applying the legal precepts of
informed consent to potentially vulnerable human subject popula-
tions;35 and (2) predicting the liability costs arising from failures
to apply these precepts successfully.
The doctrine of informed consent was first articulated in an
experimental context3 6 in response to several cases of egregious
See Fauci & Fischinger, The Development of an AIDS Vaccine: Progress and Promise;
103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 230, 234 (1988).
34 See Cherfas, HopeforAIDS Vaccines, 246 SCI. 23,23 (1989) (discussing promising
preliminary data presented by the Chiron Corporation describing development of a
"safe" vaccine which "induced T-cell immunity" in human volunteers); Cohen, AIDS
Vaccine Conference: Is "More"Better?, 250 ScI. 369,369 (1990) (describing the research
and development status of AIDS vaccine research being conducted by Applied
Biotechnology, Inc., Oncogen British Bio-Technology Group, Biocine, Genentech,
Immune Response Corp., Combridge Bioscience Corp., Connaught Laboratories,
Ltd., MicroGeneSys, Inc., Molecular Vaccines, Replican Corp., and Viral Technolo-
gies, Inc.); Garrett, supra note 30, at 5 ("Ten different [AIDS] vaccine products are
in clinical trials, and several more are being tested on animals.").
-" "'Human subject' means an individual who is or becomes a participant in
research, either as a recipient of the test article or as a control. A subject may be
either a healthy individual or a patient." 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(21)(e) (1990).
6 The doctrine was developed in medical malpractice law, but has been applied
by analogy to clinical experimentation. This analogy is not perfect, however, and the
requirements of informed consent may be even more compelling under experimental
conditions. The salient differences between clinical experimentation and medical
treatment have been described as follows:
In the investigator-subject relationship, the primary purpose is to gain
knowledge; the direct benefit to the subject may be nil, minor, or even
beneficial, but is in any case subsidiary. The investigator may or may not
be a physician; the subject may or may not be a patient.... In the
[investigator-subject relationship,] ... the main objective is to secure
knowledge; in the [physician-patient relationship,] ... the welfare of the
patient is the overriding consideration .... [T]he former relationship may
be characterized as a scientific alliance ....
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exploitation of clinical subjects. s 7 Since that time, the doctrine has
been widely accepted by the courts, incorporated into federal, state
and international codes, and has become a bulwark of legal
protection for individual autonomy38 both in and out of the
clinical research setting.
39
Blumgart, The Medical Frameworkjbr Viewing the Problem of Human Experimentation. 98
DAEDALUS 248, 255-56 (1969).
37 See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 182-
83, 276-77 (1979); Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1978) (discussing a 40-year syphilis study which became
public in the 1970s, in which black males with the disease were monitored but
untreated, despite the availability of effective treatment during the final twenty years
of the experiment).
38 For a discussion of patient autonomy, see Shultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Intees4 95 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1985) (concluding that
patient preferences generally ought to be controlling over other interests).
39 The informed consent doctrine has been extensively addressed by courts and
legislatures. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Mackey v.
Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md.
1979); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1982) (authorizing the FDA to approve any "new drug"
experimentation using human subjects which involves interstate commerce); National
Research Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (1985) (creating the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research which
has authored ethical guidelines for human experimentation resulting in The Belmont
Report); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24171-75
(West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 458.331(l)(u), 460.413(1)(t), § 768.46 (West 1981,1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3
(1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4301-99-4306 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West
1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.40-320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2905, 2905-A
(1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.110 (1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-C:1(III), 507-C:2(II) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-
2446 (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.54 (Anderson 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 6602-03 (Purdon 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
14-5 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-234-
37.1-241 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050, 7.70.060 (Supp. 1990); 21
C.F.R. § 50.40-.48 (1990) (protections pertaining to clinical investigations involving
prisoners as subjects); 45 C.F.R. § 46.301-06 (1990) (additional protections pertaining
to biomedical and behavioral research involving prisoners as subjects); The Nuremburg
Code (1949) (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 11, 1946),
reprinted in R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH app. 3, at 285
(1981); World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding
Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (adopted by 18th
World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, Finland (1964), revised by 29th World Medical
Assembly, Tokyo, Japan (1975)), reprinted in R. LEVINE, supra, app. 4, at 287.
Despite the foregoing provisions, recent developments suggest that there are
some circumstances in which a waiver of the informed consent requirement can be
justified.
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Informed consent may embody a number of elements,40 but
generally requires that a research subject (or her authorized
representative) be competent to agree voluntarily to a risk about
which she is knowledgeable. Since it is the duty of the sponsor of
a clinical trial to effectuate these requirements,41 lack of informed
consent is likely to constitute the major factor leading to manufac-
turer liability during the course of vaccine trials.
42
On December 21,1990, an interim rule was promulgated by the FDA, amending
current informed consent regulations for American military personnel serving in the
Persian Gulf. See Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination
That Informed Consent Is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1990). The new rule
allows U.S. troops to be given experimental drugs targeted against the chemical and
biological weapons most likely to be deployed in military combat. According to the
new provision, these drugs, none of which has yet been approved by the FDA for its
proposed use, may be given to soldiers without their consent. See id. The new rule
requires tfiat the Defense Department request a waiver from the FDA for each drug
or biologic sought to be administered. Waivers are to be granted on a case-by-case
basis. See id.
The Defense Department received such waivers for the use of two drugs, and an
unidentified soldier stationed in Saudi Arabia sought to enjoin their application. The
District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the FDA justification for the
interim rule that "certain military concerns may make obtaining informed consent
from military personnel in combat impracticable." Doe v. Sullian, 756 F. Supp. 12,
16 (D.D.C. 1991). The court denied the injunction of the drugs' application based
on the military nature of the Defense Department decisions involved, which the court
declined to second-guess. Id. at 17.
Public debate on the new policy has been vigorous, with opinions sharply
divided. Some take a position recognizing both the difficulty of obtaining informed
consent in the heat of battle and the need to protect adequately military personnel
who could not be excused from their duties if they were able to exercise informed
consent. See Gladwell, Suit Filed to Block Use of Unapproved Drugs on U.S. Troops, Wash.
Post, Jan. 12, 1991, at A22, col. 1. Others question whether war is a sufficient
justification for "'the loss of normal protections that all citizens should have with
respect to experimental drugs.'" Suplee, FDA Consents To Use of Unapproved Drugs on
U.S. Desert Troops, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1990, at A10, col. 5 (quoting Arthur Caplan,
director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota).
40 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.48 (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)-(b) (1990) (providing
the general requirements for informed consent).
41 The regulations contain a broad definition of "sponsor," including an
individual, pharmaceutical company, governmental agency, academic institution,
private organization, or other organization. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (1990). Under
the regulations, the sponsor's duty to obtain informed consent is clear: "no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these
regulations unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent
of the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative." Id. § 50.20.
42 See generally Thompson, Protecting 'Human Guinea Pigs,'FDA CONSUMER, Dec.-
Jan. 1987, at 15 (noting that while the "FDA does not require that subjects be
compensated if there is injury or other untoward result.., in any study that involves
more than minimal risk, subjects must be told before they enter the study whether
compensation and medical treatment will be provided and what that compensation
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Given the manner in which modern courts have dealt with the
informed consent issue in medical research, it is likely that breaches
of the duty to obtain informed consent during either non-
therapeutic or therapeutic research will be actionable under a
negligence standard.43 While this standard is lower than the strict
liability standard that could exist for vaccine manufacturers who
reach the market with their products, 44 a negligence standard may
still be problematic.
First, it may be difficult for manufacturers to determine the
appropriate type and amount of information that must be disclosed
to subjects in order to meet the knowledge requirement.
45
Although federal regulations set out the elements of informed
consent for federally funded experiments, 46 the regulations do not
preempt applicable state or local laws. 47  Additionally, not all
experiments will be federally funded, and therefore federal
will be or how to obtain information about it").
43 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
512 (1972) (noting the trend toward categorizing the failure to obtain informed
consent as negligence); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 598-600, 207 N.W.2d
297, 312-13 (1973) (quoting Dean Prosser who observed that actions for the failure
to obtain informed consent are properly viewed as negligence actions).
To prevail under a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove the existence of
four factors: (1) a legal duty of the defendant that must be fulfilled in accordance
with an established standard; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) injury, damage, or loss
suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) a causal nexus between the defendant's breach of
duty, and the injury, damage or loss sustained by the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
Some courts, however, do still occasionally use other methods of analysis when
dealing with these cases. See, e.g., Spikes v. Heath, 175 Ga. App. 187, 332 S.E.2d 889
(1985) (applying a fraud standard); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 750 (Tenn.
1987) (noting that the failure to provide adequate informed consent "is not
negligence but battery").
44 See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
45 The "knowledge" requirement demands more than the mere provision of
information-the information provided must be understood. See Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1270, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (noting that
language and educational barriers may have impinged upon the plaintiff's ability to
give informed consent); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 284-85, 289 P.2d 173, 175-76
(1955) (recognizing that although the patient had signed a consent form for the
procedure, she had failed to understand the meaning of the word "mastectomy"); see
also Rutenberg, Clearer Medical Consent Forms Needed, UPI, Nov. 18, 1983 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPI file) (stating that Veterans Administration researchers found that
"efforts to protect the rights of research subjects through federal regulations have
resulted in ... [information] but [have not] ensur[ed] that the information is
comprehensible, understood, and used").
46 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1990); 30 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974).
4 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(c) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(e) (1990).
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informed consent regulations premised on federal funding may not
apply.48 Since federal regulations may be neither applicable nor
controlling, the knowledge requirement may be significantly
determined by statutes that speak to the issue of informed consent
and articulate specific disclosure standards. The doctrine of
informed consent, as developed with regard to patient procedures
generally, indicates that there will be subtle yet significant jurisdic-
tional distinctions as to whether the appropriate standard of
disclosure is: (1) information that a reasonable investigator would
disclose;4 9 (2) information that a reasonable subject would want to
know;50 (3) information about which the individual subject in-
volved in testing would wish to be apprised;51 or (4) information
that a reasonable subject with the characteristics of the individual
involved in testing would wish to know.
52
Second, it may be difficult for manufacturers to satisfy the
requirement of voluntariness53 as they attempt to provide legally
adequate informed consent to the selected subjects. The selection
of subjects has already focused on one of several high-risk popula-
tions. 54  Certain high-risk populations-intravenous drug users,
HIV-infected women and men, partners of infected individuals
(including prostitutes), and prisoners or mentally incompetent
subjects who fall into the foregoing categories-are probably the
48 For instance, California has already stimulated the process of AIDS vaccine
development by enacting legislation that will permit human trials within the state
without federal authorization. See infra text accompanying notes 196-209.
49 See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419 n.11 (5th Cir.) (discussing the
majority rule which compels a physician to disclose facts which a reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed to her patient
regarding the proposed treatment), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
50 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.) (finding no duty
to disclose dangers of which the person of average sophistication would be aware),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
51 See e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (stating that a
physician may withhold disclosure where it would alarm an emotionally upset or
apprehensive patient).
52 See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985) (using the "reasonable
person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncracies and
religious beliefs").
s Voluntariness exists when persons are able to "exercis[e] choice about an action
free of coercion or undue influence by another person." T. BEAUcHAMP & j.
CHILDRESS, supra note 37, at 81.
54 See Novick, Clinical Trials with Vulnerable or Disrespected Subjects, 4 AIDS & PUB.
PoL'YJ. 125, 129 (1989) (noting that medical scientists involved in planning initial
vaccine trials have reportedly suggested that gay men were the appropriate subjects
because "their physiology has been altered as a result of their lifestyle and because
they will be the first to benefit from an effective vaccine").
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least likely to have the capacity to withstand coercion or undue
influence.55  Many individuals within high-risk, or otherwise
suspect subpopulations often lack: (1) access to a public forum
where they can voice their grievances; (2) adequate medical
knowledge to question the quality5 6 and effects of their experimen-
tal treatment; (3) adequate legal knowledge to bring lawsuits seeking
compensation for research related injuries; and (4) either the
physical5 7 or financial58 willpower to resist the temptation to
agree to experimentation in exchange for monetary reimbursement
or the promise of a "cure."
55 See id. at 126-28. Scientists also appear to be enthusiastic about recruiting other
suspect populations to the vaccine testing effort: Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), stated that "NIAID
hopes especially to enroll more blacks [and] Hispanics .... groups [that] ... have
been 'underrepresented' in clinical trials." Clinical Trials Hotline Open; Patients Sought
for Studies, AIDS POL'Y & LAW, May 17, 1989, at 5; see also Green, The Transmission
of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 28,32,303 n.38 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987) ("A
disproportionately high percentage of AIDS patients are black largely because
disadvantaged groups are more likely to fall victim to the abuse of drugs.").
56 For example, AIDS vaccine trials currently underway are based on the least
common strain of the AIDS virus and may be of limited therapeutic value. See
Garrett, supra note 11, at 5 ("All of the vaccines currently being used on hundreds of
human volunteers in the United States are based on a strain of the human
immunodeficiency virus called HTLVIIIb. ... [This strain] is one of the least common
of what may be hundreds of AIDS viruses found in nature").
The therapeutic nature of clinical trial Phases II-IV also results in patients'
inability to adequately assess the quality of their treatment. Randomized, double-
blind, controlled clinical trials (RCCT) will have to be conducted to evaluate the
therapy of choice for a uniformly fatal disease. In an RGCT, neither the patient nor
the investigator is told whether the patient is receiving a placebo or one of two or
more alternate therapy regimens. Patients must be randomly allocated to treatment
regimens, in order to correctly attribute pharmacodynamic effects to the vaccine
under study. With a disease such as AIDS which appears to be uniformly fatal, grave
questions are raised as to the ethical appropriateness of giving a trial group a placebo
or a toxic or ineffective control vaccine. Further, since the RCCT may provide the
only access to curative therapy, the participation of patients who have no alternatives
to a Phase IV trial may be coerced. It would appear that the demands of RCCT's are
not easily reconciled with the requirements for informed consent. See generally
Levine, The Apparent Incompatibility Between Informed Consent and Placebo-Controlled
Clinical Trials, 42 CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPY 247 (1987); Macklin & Friedland,
Aids Research: The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 14 LAW MD. & HEALTH CARE 273 (1986).
57 The alternatives to participation in research are often nonexistent for critically
ill patients. See Scott, 'Freeze' on Drug Testing Feared; Clinical Trials Under Attack on
Many Fronts, L.A. Times, June 12, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
58 "There are many reasons why people volunteer to be human guinea pigs for
research projects, but money remains the drawing card for many, who can make $50
or $60 for giving blood or undergoing painful tests." UPI, Dec. 27, 1982 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPI file).
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Beyond the issue of voluntariness, there are a number of reasons
why the use of high-risk subpopulations in nontherapeutic clinical
trials may not permit proper characterization of vaccine effects.
59
Despite these reasons, a number of rationales have been put forth
to justify the recruitment of these individuals. One explanation is
that male homosexuals "would be one of the top choices to
participate in a vaccine trial because of their well-recognized
compliance in clinical trials, such as the trial of a vaccine for
hepatitis. "6 Another rationale stems from the concern that
despite confidentiality protections, participation in clinical trials
may identify volunteers as being at high risk for HIV infection, due
to their "lengthy period of interaction with investigators."
61
Ostensibly, the stigma of being identified as an HIV-infected
individual is more easily born by members of subpopulations in
which the rates of HIV infection are higher. A third suggestion is
that trial data will have greater relevance if there is a chance that
participants will engage in high-risk behavior and thereby challenge
the vaccine: if the volunteers' immunological profile remained
unaffected after continued high-risk behavior, this would serve as
striking evidence of a vaccine's efficacy.62 Finally, a more suspi-
cious justification may favor the selection of high-risk sub-
populations for clinical trials; namely, that less vulnerable individu-
als are unwilling to assume the risks of participation in AIDS
vaccine trials.63 These factors may manipulate the exercise of free
59 First, it will be difficult to make safety determinations as to whether an HIV
infection that progresses to AIDS is a vaccine-related phenomenon or the result of
a latent infection that occurred prior to the onset of the trial. See Wright, Flying
Blind, 258 Sc. AM. 35, 36 (1988). Second, it may not be relevant to use data
generated from high-risk populations to predict the severity of vaccine-associated
disease in the general population, since there is a risk that prior infection may have
compromised the immune response of a high-risk volunteer. See Novick, supra note
54, at 130.
60 Development, supra note 4, at 374 (1989) (citation omitted).
61 Mariner & Gallo, Getting to Market: The Scientific and Legal ClimateforDeveloping
an AIDS Vaccine, 15 LAw, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 17, 20 (1987).62 See Rothman, Ethical and Social Issues in the Development of New Drugs and
Vaccines, 63 BuLL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 557, 565 (1987).
63 Until recently, no acceptable animal model, computer model, or in vivo model
existed in which to demonstrate the probable efficacy of an AIDS vaccine. See supra
note 11. This meant that ongoing Phase I testing was being conducted without the
rudimentary protections provided by animal safety data. As one investigator rather
callously noted:
People will say you shouldn't do a vaccine trial because we haven't shown
it's a system that works in the monkeys with SIV or the SCID mice or
whatever. I'll ask from now until that happens how many hundreds or
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choice by high-risk subpopulations and undermine the legitimacy of
their participation as informed volunteers in clinical trials.
64
As investigators try to appraise the efficacy of the vaccines
currently available, "applications for human testing of experimental
vaccines are piling up at the FDA .... ,65 In designing clinical
trial protocols, manufacturers must acknowledge the vulnerability
of potential subjects, and determine how to implement safeguards
for their protection while still keeping access to trials as equitable
as possible. 66 In light of the risks that volunteers will be asked to
thousands of people will be infected with HIV while we do animal studies
.... What do we lose? If the vaccine is toxic, we made a major mistake, we
hurt a lot of people. Well, that's a danger of clinical research. People who
volunteer accept that risk-that's what it's all about.
Garrett, supra note 11, at 5.
It is noteworthy that even N.I.H. scientists have taken themselves out of the pool
of potential experimental subjects:
Despite the rich tradition of scientists' trying new vaccines on themselves
... N.I.H. scientists conducting the AIDS vaccine experiments have decided
against this.
[One researcher] said in an interview that the decision against self-
experimentation was not because of any unwillingness on the researchers'
part to share the risks they are asking other people to take. Rather, he said
they ruled it out in the belief that scientists conducting a human experi-
ment, and thus emotionally involved, could not be objective in giving
informed consent on themselves. He cited another reason: some of the
researchers might feel pressure from superiors and others to agree to be
vaccinated.
Altman, The Doctor's World;Protecting Volunteers in AIDS Vaccine Tes4 N.Y. Times, Aug.
25, 1987, at Cl, col. 5.
'4 Despite these vulnerabilities, it would be incorrect to assume that benefits are
nonexistent for individual members of these populations. See Scott, Medicine; On
Tria4 L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, Magazine, at 60 (stating that patients get early access
to promising treatments and sophisticated medical care).
65 Wright, supra note 59, at 36.
66 Institutions receiving federal research monies are provided with the limited
safeguard of oversight committees, called Institutional Review Boards, or IRB's. An
IRB is required by regulation to review all clinical experimentation involving human
subjects. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.107 (1990); Scanlon, Experiment Safeguards; Research review
Boards Weigh the Benefits and Risks, Newsday, Mar. 28, 1989, at 15. But see Rothman,
supra note 62, at 558 ("[S]everal studies indicate serious weaknesses in institutional
review board operations; there are significant variations in the diligence with which
boards perform their assignments and in the substantive decisions that they make....
[A]n investigator who is dissatisfied or impatient with board decisions at one
institution can move his research to another."). Most state statutes, however, do not
have an IRB requirement.
One area where IRB's might constructively impact future testing efforts is in
expanding access to clinical trials. Inequitable access is not only discriminatory, it
may also have a significant impact on the validity of data subsequently accumulated.
See Roan, Sex, Ethnic Bias in Medical Research Raises Questions, L.A. Times, Aug. 3,
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take,67 this effort must be made by the manufacturers who stand
to profit from their participation.
III. LEGAL ROADBLOCKS IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE IMPOSITION OF
TORT LiABILITY ON VACCINE MANUFACTURERS
Despite scrupulous attention to vaccine preparation and testing,
manufacturers may still face tort liability exposure once products
reach the marketplace. The specter of liability has already forced
many manufacturers of childhood vaccines out of the market-
place, 68 threatening a large sector of society with the risk of
preventable diseases. To avoid a similar situation in the AIDS
context, vaccine manufacturers must have some degree of insulation
from civil tort actions.
A. Applicable Theories of Liability
It is most likely that persons seeking compensation from AIDS
vaccine manufacturers will advance a legal theory of either strict
liability or negligence. 69  Strict liability is distinguished from
negligence in that the former doctrine attaches without proof of
fault by the manufacturer. 70 It does not require that plaintiffs
"impugn the conduct of the maker or other seller[,] but [they are]
required to impugn the product."7 1 The doctrine of strict liability
is of continuing vitality in most states.72 Underlying its application
1990, at Al, col. 1.
67 See Mariner & Gallo, supra note 61, at 20 (noting that participation may have
detrimental effects on employment, insurance coverage, and social life).
68 See infra text accompanying note 78.
69 Although these are the most likely theories on which a cause of action will be
based, manufacturers may also be sued for misrepresentation, misbranding,
mispackaging, breach of contract, or under the theories of alternative liability, concert
of action, industry-wide liability, or market share liability. For a comprehensive
review of medical products liability law, see Maedgen & McCall, A Survey of Law
Regarding the Liability of the Manufacturers and Sellers of Drug Products and Medical
Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 397-428 (1986) (explaining the various theories of
liability to which manufacturers may be subjected).
70 See supra note 43 (discussing the four elements that the plaintiff must prove in
order to prevail on a negligence theory).
71 W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984).
72 Most states have adopted some form of the strict liability doctrine as it is set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 694. Section 402A of the
Restatement provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
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are a number of policy considerations which find their genesis in
Judge Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co..73 First, "manufacturer[s] can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, [whereas] the public
cannot."74  Second, manufacturers should be deterred from
bringing defective products to the marketplace. 75 Third, manufac-
turers are best situated to insure against a product's risk and
distribute such costs to consumers.
76
Weighing against strict liability is a fear that the development
and production of valuable -products will be curtailed if manufactur-
ers find that they are being used as "deep pockets" to compensate
victims for all unforeseeable product-related injuries. While urging
his colleagues to support the establishment of uniform federal rules
for product liability,77 one senator noted,
Manufacturers, whose survival depends on narrow margins
and, consequently, close control of costs, are confronted with one
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
73 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
74 Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
75 See id.
76 See id. The Supreme Court of NewJersey has also recognized this argument:
[T]he manufacturers and distributors of defective products can best allocate
the costs of the injuries resulting from those products. The premise is that
the price of a product should reflect all of its costs, including the cost of
injuries caused by the product. This can best be accomplished by imposing
liability on the manufacturer and distributors. Those persons can insure
against liability and incorporate the cost of the insurance in the price of the
product.
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205-6, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982). But see Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The
Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 285 (1988)
(discussing how the declining predictability of liability assignments in the courts has
threatened to obliterate the ability of manufacturers and insurers to spread their risk
efficiently).
77 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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great unknowable cost: Their liability for legal claims against
them....
The rise in product liability costs and the threat of litigation
have forced many manufacturers to withdraw useful products from
the market and to cancel the research and development of new,
innovative and, at times, life-saving products.... Lederle Labora-
tories is now the sole U.S. manufacturer of the DPT vaccine for
polio. Merck & Co. is the only producer of the combined measles,
mumps and rubella vaccine. All others have left the field due to
the threat of product liability lawsuits.
78
Acknowledging the public's interest in the development and
availability of prescription drugs and vaccines, the drafters of
section 402A carved out an exception for "unavoidably unsafe"
products. 79  The application of comment k requires that the
manufacturer has "properly prepared and marketed and [given]
proper warning"80 for the product in question. If the manufactur-
er has satisfied these preconditions, it will be exempt from strict
liability, provided the product in question is unavoidably unsafe.8 1
Underlying the comment k exemption are two significant policy
rationales. First, many products may not be able to be made safe
for their intended and ordinary use:
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warnings is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous .... [T]he seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.
8 2
Second, society's need for certain products is of such magnitude
that the manufacturers of those products should not be subject to
strict liability, despite the fact that consumers may be injured by the
use of their products.8 3
78 136 CONG. REC. S16,661 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
7' For an overview of the history of section 402A, see 41 A.L.I. PROC. 349 (1964);
Comment, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Responsibility
for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 199, 201-02 (1984).
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
81 See id.
82 id.
83 Although this justification is not explicitly set forth in comment k, it is
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B. Judicial Application of Comment k to Pharmaceutical Products
A majority ofjurisdictions have adopted comment k8 4 and have
recognized its particular relevance to prescription drugs and
vaccines.8 5 However, as one court pointed out, "[s]imple adoption
of Comment k does not solve the problems associated with its
application."86 Indeed, judicial application of comment k has been
exemplified by concerns voiced prior to the drafting of the comment:
During a rather confusing discussion of a draft of what was to become
section 402A, a member of the institute proposed that drugs should be
exempted from strict liability on the ground that it would be "against the
public interest" to apply the doctrine to such products because of "the very
serious tendency to stifle medical research and testing." Dean Prosser...
responded that the problem was a real one, and that he had it in mind in
drafting section 402A. A motion to exempt prescription drugs from the
section was defeated on the suggestion of Dean Prosser that the problem
could be dealt with in the comments to the section.
Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1058, 751 P.2d 470, 475, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
416 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products:
Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139,
1141 ("Society wishes to encourage the manufacture of ethical drugs, and the
research and development of new drugs. The imposition of strict liability would stifle
these goals.").
84 See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1984)
(stating that certain products, particularly ethical drugs which often cause unwanted
side effects despite careful design and manufacturing, are deemed "unavoidably
unsafe," but are not unreasonably dangerous if they are marketed with proper
directions for use or include adequate warnings of potential side effects); Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc. 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that a manufacturer
who supplies the public with an "apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk" is subject only to the "ordinary
negligence concept of duty to warn"); Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories,
447 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. 1984) (holding that with regard to "unavoidably unsafe,"
yet properly prepared prescription drugs, the adequacy of the warning determines
whether the marketed drug is defective or unreasonably dangerous); Moore v.
Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 11.7 (Iowa 1986) (requiring proper warnings and
directions for use); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 285-86, 718
P.2d 1318, 1323 (1986) (holding that the mere manufacture of a vaccine will not be
actionable on the ground of design defect), affd, 243 Kan. 291,758 P.2d. 206 (1988);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 571-72, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189 (1982) (stating
that public policy dictates rejecting strict liability in favor of negligence for drug-
related injuries).
85 See Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1141 (stating that "[w]hile comment k could be
read to apply to other [nonpharmaceutical] products, it does not really give us any
examples or suggest other areas where the policy balancing is precisely the same").
Note that comment k is generally not thought to embrace proprietary drugs. See
Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 321 n.3, 398 A.2d 132, 137
n.3 (1979) (distinguishing aspirin from products that may produce an adverse effect
when taken as recommended).
6 Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Utah 1987).
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inconsistent. Generally, courts have chosen one of two approaches:
when faced with evidence that a pharmaceutical product, properly
prepared and used according to the manufacturers' directions,
resulted in injury to a plaintiff, they have defined the scope of
comment k protection in either an expansive or a restrictive
manner. An expansive application of the exception grants all
prescription drugs the status of "unavoidably unsafe" products, and
thereby exempts the manufacturers of all such products from strict
liability based on alleged design defects in their products.87 A
restrictive application of the exception favors greater scrutiny of
individual products before determining that a product is "unavoid-
ably unsafe," and evaluates the importance of one or more of three
determinants, namely, (1) whether the risk of the product forseeably
outweighs its utility;88 (2) whether the product could have been
designed in a safer manner;89 and (3) whether feasible alternatives
for the product exist.90 A sampling of recent decisions illustrates
both of these trends.
1. Expansive Application of Comment k
Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp.91 involved a challenge to
the manufacturer of Doriden, a prescription drug for insomnia.
After reviewing the plaintiff's strict liability claim, the Maryland
district court granted immunity to the manufacturer on the basis of
the blanket protection provided by comment k.92 The court noted
that "prescription drugs are not considered unusually dangerous
under section 402A, and the manufacturer will not incur liability
under that section, unless the manufacturer has failed to provide
adequate warnings of the drug's possible dangers.
"93
Although apparently reaching the same conclusion as the Fellows
court, the Kansas Supreme Court did not explicitly state its
preference for an expansive application of comment k to all
87 See infra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
91 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980).
92 See id. at 300.
93 Id. At least one of the cases to which the court claimed to have looked for
guidance had not read comment k in quite so expansive a fashion. See infra text
accompanying notes 113-19 (discussing Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d
1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)).
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pharmaceutical products. In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.,94
the Kansas court secured immunity for a polio vaccine manufacturer
by summarily concluding that because the product at issue was "an
'unavoidably unsafe product' that [was] an 'apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk'. ... [p]ublic policy require[d] that the mere manufacture of the
vaccine not be actionable on the ground of design defect."
95
While admonishing the trial court for its failure to hear evidence on
the issue of the application of comment k "outside the presence of
the jury and [making] the determination thereon,"9 6 the supreme
court chose not to identify any particular factors that the trial court
might have considered in making this determination as a matter of
law. This decision has been interpreted as signifying the court's
belief that vaccines automatically fall within the scope of comment
k's protections.
97
In Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co.,98 a California district court
rejected the plaintiff's efforts to proceed against manufacturers of
the Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT) vaccine on the basis of strict
liability for defective design. In a brief discussion which foreshad-
owed a later pivotal decision by the Supreme Court of California,
99
the district court recognized the "automatic application of comment
k to vaccine and prescription drug cases, and the resulting foreclo-
sure of design defect strict liability [claims] . .. ."100 Although
the court dismissed the plaintiffs design defects claim, it did permit
94 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986).
95 See id. at 286, 718 P.2d at 1323.
96 Id.
97 See Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233,236 (D. Utah 1987) (citing
Johnson as support for the proposition that "[slome courts have taken the view that
Comment k applies to all design defect claims involving prescription drugs as a
matter of law.") But see Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1494-98
(D. Kan. 1987), rev'd 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511
(1990). In Graham, the defendant, a manufacturer of the DPT vaccine, argued that
based onJohnso Kansas had adopted the expansive application of comment k, and
had thereby freed vaccine manufacturers from liability for design defects as a matter
of law. The district court rejected this interpretation of Johnson, stating that in its
view, "the Johnson decision is not-nor is it intended to be-so far reaching." Id. at
1496. The court of appeals found theJohnson opinion "unclear" as to whether "the
comment (k) defense precludes a strict liability design defect claim as a matter of law
in all cases involving licensed prescription vaccines," and therefore chose to leave the
district court's interpretation undisturbed. Graham, 906 F.2d at 1406.
98 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
99 See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412
(1988); infra text accompanying notes 102-10.
1oo Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1334, n.1.
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him to pursue a claim of strict liability for manufacturing defects,
noting that comment k did not shield manufacturers from such
claims.
1 01
Similarly, in Brown v. Superior Court,102 the Supreme Court of
California agreed with an expansive interpretation of comment k
that had been articulated in the pretrial rulings of the trial
court.10 ' In its appellate review, the supreme court analyzed the
purposes for which the comment k exemption was implement-
ed,1" 4 the alternatives to a blanket immunity approach,10 5 and
the routine application of comment k in other courts, 10 6 and
concluded that comment k should exempt manufacturers of
prescription drugs from strict liability arising from claims alleging
the defective design of their products. 10 7 Although acknowledg-
ing the appeal of a more restrictive application of comment k (i.e.,
one that would seek to evaluate pharmaceutical products on a case-
by-case basis),108 the supreme court recognized that such an
application would place manufacturers in a legal quandary, 109 and
101 The court provided a helpful analysis of the distinctions between the two types
of defects:
A product has a "manufacturing defect" if and only if the product
caused a plaintiff's injury because it deviated from the manufacturer's
intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product
line.
In contrast, in the case of a design defect the injury producing agent
is common to all products of a certain line, and the defect lies in the
original design or model. A product has a design defect if and only if: (a)
the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
expected manner, or (b) the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that, on
balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk or danger
inherent in such design.
Id. at 1335 (citations and footnotes omitted).
102 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
103 See id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415. The trial court "deter-
mined that defendants could not be held strictly liable for the alleged defect in DES
but only for their failure to warn of known or knowable side effects of the drug." Id.
'04 See id. at 1058-59, 751 P.2d at 475, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
105 See id. at 1060-61, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
106 See id. at 1059-60, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
107 See id. at 1065, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
108 See id. at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481,245 Cal. Rptr. at 423 ("It seems unjust to grant
the same protection from liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the
producers of penicillin.").
109 As the court noted,
A manufacturer's incentive to develop what it might consider a superior
product would be diminished if it might be held strictly liable for harmful
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would also impede "significant advances in scientific knowledge,
discouraging the development of new and improved drugs to
combat disease."
110
The view that manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals
should be exempt from strict liability has not been consistently
adopted by all courts. The following cases illustrate a divergent
trend to remove the protective blanket of immunity from such
manufacturers, and instead use a restrictive application of comment
k that requires the case-by-case evaluation of pharmaceutical
products.
As a review of these cases will indicate, the restrictive applica-
tion of comment k is often problematic. In addition to the lack of
uniformity among courts regarding the factors to be considered in
determining whether comment k is applicable, it also may not be
clear whether it is the judge or the factfinder who should apply any
test that is developed."' 1
side effects because a trial court could decide ... that in fact another
product which was available on the market would have accomplished the
same result. Further, the question of the superiority of one drug over
another would have to be decided not in the abstract but in reference to the
plaintiff, since the advantages of a drug cannot be isolated from the
condition of a particular patient.... [D]ifferent trial judges might reach
different conclusions as to whether the same drug should be measured by
strict liability principles, because the determination in each case depends on
the evidence as well as the subjective determination of the judge.
Id. at 1067-68, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
11o Id. at 1066, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
111 For a discussion of whether the judge or the jury determines comment k
applicability, see Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987)
(infra note 121); Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d
215 (1988) (infra note 127); Johnson, 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (supra text
accompanying notes 94-97); Brown, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412
(supra note 109); see also Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990). Here, the appeals court declined to state
that the district court had abused its discretion by not holding a "mini-trial" in order
to determine the application of comment k. The court noted that "mini-trials can
result in 'undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.'" Id. at 1405 n.10 (quoting Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet
Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 935 (10th Cir. 1987)). The lower court had concluded that
the comment k assessment was one for the court to make, but one that could be
made in the presence of the jury since the evidence "will be the same evidence from
which thejury will determine negligence." Graham. 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan.
1987), re'd, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990).
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2. Restrictive Application of Comment k
In restrictively applying comment k, courts have identified one
or more of three requisites that must be established before it can be
determined that a product is unavoidably unsafe, and its manufac-
turer deserving of protection from strict liability design defect
claims.1 12 Each of these will be considered in turn below.
a. Whether the Risk of the Product Forseeably Outweighs Its
Utility
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratoriesnl3 typifies the early case law devel-
oping a risk versus benefit balancing test for the analysis of liability
claims involving prescription drugs. 114 In Reyes, the Fifth Circuit
adopted such a test for a manufacturer of the Sabin oral polio
vaccine. Although the court recognized the unavoidably unsafe
nature of the vaccine, it chose to consider whether the vaccine was
"so unsafe that marketing it at all [was] 'unreasonably dangerous per
se. ' "115 On balance, the court found that the "legitimate public
interest in [the vaccine's] availability" outweighed its risks.
116
Continuing its risk/benefit analysis, the Reyes court also
considered whether the vaccine had been "introduced into the
stream of commerce without sufficient safeguards."11 7 Conclud-
ing that the manufacturer had not met its duty to warn individual
consumers about the risk posed by the vaccine, the court found the
this failure "itself present[ed] a 'defect' in the product . . . [that]
cause[d] the product to be 'unreasonably dangerous as market-
ed."'11 8  The manufacturer was held strictly liable for this so-
called design defect.
11 9
Similarly, in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,120 the Idaho Su-
112 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
115 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
114 See also Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). This
opinion preceded Reyes and likewise held that the Sabin oral polio vaccine was an
unavoidably unsafe product qualifying for comment k treatment, since "on balance,
public interest demands that it be made available notwithstanding its dangerous
characteristics." Id. at 128. Regardless, the court found the manufacturer strictly
liable because it had failed adequately to warn individual consumers of the risks
associated with the product. See id. at 130-31.
115 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1273.
116 Id. at 1274.
117 Id. at 1273.
118 Id. at 1275.
119 See id. at 1277.
120 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297, ans. conformed to, 828 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1987),
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preme Court clearly contemplated the weighing of a product's risks
and benefits prior to making the determination of unavoidable
unsafety necessary for comment k application. The court stated that
in order for a manufacturer to prevail in securing comment k
protection, the judge or the factfinder would have to be apprised of
convincing evidence that the product at issue survived a risk/benefit
test.121 Pointing out that comment k refers "to 'some' products
which are avoidably unsafe," 122 the court refused to grant blanket
protection to all pharmaceutical products. Voicing a concern that
would later be rationalized by the Brown court, 123 the Idaho
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t does not serve society that an
unavoidably unsafe product, which has occasional or fractious
benefit, should enjoy insulation from strict liability in tort when the
product's predominant effects are detrimental to individual and
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988). For specification of the questions certified to the
Idaho Supreme court, see Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429, 1432-33 (9th
Cir. 1986). As noted in Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 n.6
(D. Kan. 1987), rev'd, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511
(1990), "the Idaho court's finding[s] [are]-in effect-the law of the Ninth Circuit."
The reversal of the district court was based on evidentiary errors that occurred at
trial, including the exclusion of expert testimony concerning causation and the
distorted redaction of one exhibit. See Graham, 906 F.2d at 1410-11, 1413. The
circuit court agreed with the district court's relevant conclusions regarding comment
k and preemption. See id. at 1405-06.
121 The court noted that "[c]learly, the comment contemplates a weighing of the
benefit of the product against its risk. Obviously, for comment k to apply, the benefit
must outweigh the risk. This weighing process should consider the value of the
benefit, the seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both." Toner, 112 Idaho at
337, 732 P.2d at 306 (citations omitted).
The court placed the burden of proving comment k's application on the
manufacturer, stating that "comment k is an affirmative defense to a claim based on
strict liability." Id. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308.
Note that because it was not presented with the issue, the Toner court did not
address the question of "whether the judge orjury ought to determine the application
of comment k to a particular product." Id. at 339 n.9, 732 P.2d at 308 n.9. However,
the court noted that
[s]ome courts and commentators, emphasizing the factual determinations
necessary, leave it to thejury. Others, concerned with the policy implica-
tions of the decision, would have the court decide comment k's application
as a matter of law.
Either way, the decision of the applicability of comment k pertains only
to claims based on defective design, and not to those based on defective
manufacture or inadequate warning. The latter two raise questions of fact
to be decided by the jury.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1147-48 (noting that issues
underlying comment k are of law and policy, and thus best suited to judicial review).
122 Toner, 112 Idaho at 339, 732 P.2d at 308.
123 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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public safety." 124 The court held that based on the best available
evidence at the time of product distribution, "the scales must clearly
tip in favor of the benefits for comment k to apply."125 The
comment would be applied on a case-by-case basis, "when the
situation calls for it."
126
In Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,12 7 the Oregon
Supreme Court endeavored to resolve some of the uncertainty
relating to comment k's application under Oregon law. Although
declining to make a determination as to whether the DPT vaccine
at issue was unavoidably unsafe, and thereby deserving of comment
k protection, 128 the court noted that such a determination would
raise "[i]ssues of the vaccine's efficacy, the degree of risk attending
its use, and the extent to which it is in fact 'unavoidably
unsafe'.... 12 9 Once again an expansive application of comment
k was rejected in favor of one which would examine and ostensibly
balance the risks and benefits of the manufactured product.
A risk/benefit approach to identifying unavoidably unsafe
products was also set out by the Eighth Circuit in Hill v. Searle
Laboratories.130 Evaluating comment k's application to a medical
device, the CU-7 copper intrauterine device, the court determined
that it was not the intent of the drafters of comment k to "grant all
manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket exception to strict
124 Toner, 112 Idaho at 337, 732 P.2d at 306 (citations omitted).
125 Id. at 337, 732 P.2d at 306. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on many of the
arguments set forth in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 453 (1985). Kearl was overruled by the California Supreme Court in Brown v.
Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1061, 751 P.2d 470, 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418
(1988).
126 Toner, 112 Idaho at 339, 732 P.2d at 308; see also Patten v. Lederle Laborato-
ries, 676 F. Supp. 233, 236-37 (D. Utah 1987) (fashioning an application of comment
k based on Toner, declining to "provide blanket immunity to all prescription drugs,"
and determining that "the defendant must demonstrate that, weighing the benefits
of the product against its risks, it is apparently useful and desirable"); Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 97 NJ. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984) ("Whether a drug
is unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis; we perceive no
justification for giving all prescription manufacturers a blanket immunity from strict
liability manufacturing and design defect claims under comment k.").
127 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988), as. conformed to, 850 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.
1988). For certifications to the Oregon Supreme court, see Senn v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 850 F.2d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1988).
128 See Senn, 305 Or. at 263 n.4, 751 P.2d at 218 n.4 ("We agree with the Idaho
Supreme Court's statement that 'it is not for a court sitting on appeal to [determine
whether a vaccine is entitled to comment k protection]. The determination would
require a full evidentiary hearing such as only a trial court can provide.'").
129 Id. at 263 n.4, 751 P.2d at 219 n.4.
10 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
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liability."15 1 The court preferred to align itself with what it be-
lieved were "[t]he better reasoned opinions" that supported a "view
that the unavoidably unsafe exception should only apply upon a
showing of exceptional social need.
" 132
b. Whether the Product Could Have Been Designed in a Safer
Manner
In Toner, ' 33 the Idaho Supreme Court articulated an addition-
al factor to be considered in determining whether a product was
unavoidably unsafe and its manufacturer thereby encompassed
under comment k's protection: the inherent risks of the product at
issue had to be inescapable. The court explained that this meant
that "the design [of the product] must be as safe as the best
available testing and research permits." 34 Presumably the court
believed that either the judge or the jury was entitled to review
state-of-the-art methodology on a case-by-case basis, and determine
whether a product's benefits might have been achieved in another
manner.1
3 5
c. Whether Feasible Alternatives for the Product Exist
In Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,13 6 a non-vaccine case
involving the oral contraceptive Ortho-Novum 2, the court affirmed
a jury verdict that permitted an expanded reading of the plaintiff's
defective design claim. The court reasoned that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that because a similar, equally
effective, and safer contraceptive had been available, the "risk posed
by the 100 mcg. pill outweighed whatever advantages, if any, it
131 Id. at 1069.
132 Id. (citations omitted); see also Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen,
665 P.2d 118, 123 (Colo. 1983) (stating that "in order to fall within the comment k
exception, not only should an unavoidably unsafe product carry a unique or profound
benefit, but that benefit should extend to the vast majority of users of the product").
133 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987).
1s4 Id. at 337, 732 P.2d at 306.
135 See Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D. Utah 1987)
(restating the proposition discussed in Toner that "[c]omment k does not require that
sellers be omniscient, but it does hold them to the current state of the art"); White
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 395, 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1988) (citing
Toner for the proposition that "not all drugs are so perfectly designed that they
cannot be made more pure or more safe ... ."). For a discussion of whether such
determinations are to be made by the judge or the jury, see supra note 121.
136 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
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might have had over [other oral contraceptives with] lower dosages-
in other words, that the Ortho-Novum 2 mg. was unreasonably
dangerous." 137  The existence of an equally effective, safer pill
denied the manufacturer of the Ortho-Novum pill comment k
protection. The manufacturer was found strictly liable for defective
product design.
138
The plaintiffs in Toner argued that a viable fractionated cell DPT
vaccine was available, posed a lower risk, and was immunologically
superior to the defendant's whole cell vaccine.1 39 This prompted
the Idaho Supreme court to require that in order for comment k to
apply, "there must be, at the time of the subject product's distribu-
tion, no feasible alternative design which on balance accomplishes
the subject product's purpose with a lesser risk."140 However, the
court left room for the exercise of some license in making this
determination. It recognized that even if a safer or more effective
substitute product were available, it would not necessarily be
superior. If a riskier product satisfied broader social utility goals it
could survive the "feasible alternative" test.
141
137 Id. at 655 n.4. See generally Comment, Can a Prescription Drug Be Defectively
Designed?-Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 31 DE PAUL L. RzV. 247, 260-68
(1981) (discussing the impact of drug design litigation on the pharmaceutical field).
138 The manufacturer was also found liable for failing to warn the prescribing
physician of risks associated with the product. See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 658-59.
139 See Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
140 Toner, 112 Idaho at 337, 732 P.2d at 306.
141 The court noted:
The evaluation of a purported alternative design and the subject product's
design should consider the magnitude of the subject product's risk that the
alternative avoids, the financial costs of the compared designs, the benefits
of the compared designs, and the relative safety of the compared designs,
including any new risk that the alternative would pose.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ackley v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 89-3821, slip.
op. at 12 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 1990). In Ackley, the court explained that in order to
defeat a claim that a product is unavoidably unsafe, the challenger must
show an alternative that is Pareto-superior, that is, a product that is at least as
effective and also provides less risk. Appellants cannot state a claim for
strict liability merely by showing an alternative that provides an alleged
modicum of reduction of risk at the expense of some loss of effectiveness.
Id. (citations omitted).
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C. Application of Comment k to an AIDS Vaccine Design Defect
Given the diversity of approaches the courts have taken when
applying comment k, it is impossible to predict exactly which, if any,
of the criteria discussed above will guide individual courts as they
determine whether an AIDS vaccine is unavoidably unsafe, and
whether the manufacturer will be held strictly liable for injuries
caused by this product. If manufacturers can survive the less
solicitous, restrictive application of comment k, then theoretically
they will be exempt from strict liability for design defects under any
analysis.
An AIDS vaccine is likely to satisfy the three conditions which
various courts, using the restrictive application, have required for
demonstrating the quality of "unavoidable unsafety," the precondi-
tion for comment k immunity.
142
First, an AIDS vaccine should easily satisfy any risk/benefit
requirement, since it will provide protection from HIV infection
and reduce the incidence of AIDS, a fatal disease for which there is
no satisfactory treatment. Because the development and production
of an AIDS vaccine are of paramount importance, the interest in
vaccine availability is likely to outweigh the policy rationales for
imposing strict liability on manufacturers.
143
In addition, some of the policy rationales may be inapplicable
to an AIDS vaccine. For example, it may not be feasible for
manufacturers to assess adequately the risks associated with an AIDS
vaccine at the time of its distribution, and thus the manufacturer
may not be in any better position to insure against or absorb the
liability costs certain to be associated with this product if it is
subject to a strict liability analysis.
144
Second, it is likely that FDA oversight will facilitate manufactur-
er compliance with standards sufficient to ensure that vaccines
which reach the marketplace embody the safest design known at the
time of their distribution. If design defect claims against AIDS
manufacturers parallel the -cases brought to date against DPT and
polio vaccine manufacturers, such claims will be based either on the
142 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
143 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
144 As the California Assembly noted, the development costs of a vaccine may not
be recoupable for the manufacturer. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.51(a)
(West Supp. 1990). In addition, casualty insurers may be reluctant to provide
coverage for a product having risks that do not lend themselves to actuarial
calculations. See Berger, supra xaote 76, at 288.
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premise that a selected combination of vaccines is inappropri-
ate, 145 or that an acellular or fractionated cell vaccine would have
been safer than the manufactured product.146  Unless there is
evidence that either of these allegedly unsafe characteristics could
have been avoided without eliminating the vaccine's usefulness, it
is unlikely that an AIDS vaccine manufacturer will be found to have
ignored safer design alternatives. The existence of these allegedly
safe characteristics should become apparent to, and be corrected by
manufacturers during the course of toxicology studies and carefully
constructed clinical trials, and the FDA should become aware of
such problems in its evaluations of clinical data.147  Thus, the
vaccine which a manufacturer markets should, with the supervision
of the FDA, be of the safest design known at the time of distribu-
tion.
Third, although the existence of feasible alternatives may affect
marketing decisions by AIDS vaccine manufacturers, with respect to
145 See Stromsodt v. Park-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (1966), aff'd, 411 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1969). This case illustrates the problems that can arise from the use
of combination vaccines. In Stromsod the solution in which four vaccines were
combined effected the potency of one vaccine, and ultimately caused injury to the
plaintiff. Id. at 992-93. The district court implicitly viewed the benefits attendant to
use of the combination as insufficient to justify its risk, noting that "[t]his was not a
situation where an epidemic existed or where need justified the risk of prematurely
marketing [the combination vaccine] since products were already available to the
medical profession that satisfactorily accomplished what [the combination vaccine]
was designed to do." Id. at 996.
146 See supra text accompanying note 139.
147 In attempting to determine the scope of their liability for design defects,
manufacturers may, however, encounter two difficulties somewhat unique to the AIDS
vaccine effort.
First, the long period of viral incubation prior to manifestation of the disease
means that injured plaintiffs may only be identifiable many years after a vaccine is
administered. In design defect litigation brought long after product distribution, a
jury will have to harmonize an array of subjective determinations, all based on
hindsight, as to which early vaccine designs offered greater safety and efficacy.
Second, difficulties for manufacturers may arise from the secrecy that has been
attached to the vaccine research effort. See Foreman, Secrecy in AIDS Research, Boston
Globe, Apr. 13, 1987, at 43, col. 1. One result of this secrecy is unwitting exposure
to future liabilityif evidence of the experience attendant to particular vaccine designs
is selectively distributed among scientists and physicians. As has been noted,
[m]anufacturers are deemed to know whatever information is available in
the scientific community. This means that they may not avoid liability by
neglecting to keep up with the state of research. At the same time, it does
not require them to know the unknowable. Thus the information for which
they are likely to be held responsible should be limited to that available in
the literature and presented at scientific meetings.
Mariner & Galo, supra note 61, at 23.
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pricing strategies or target groups,148 it seems unlikely to cause
every potential manufacturer to withdraw from the market altogeth-
er. Until regulatory approval is granted for the marketing of at least
two AIDS vaccines, alternative concerns are truly speculative; the
superiority of a single vaccine obviously cannot be determined in
the abstract.
D. Comment k and the Manufacturer's Duty to Warn
A final legal issue for manufacturers concerns the scope of their
duty to warn under comment k.14 9  Case law1 50 and legal com-
148 For example, liability problems would probably be avoided if a manufacturer
produced a vaccine that showed occasional adverse effects when administered to an
elderly population, but was the only effective vaccine for children.
149 Even when it has been established that a product is unavoidably unsafe, a
manufacturer may still not be entitled to the comment k exemption if it failed to
warn of known risks associated with the product. Under comment k, the failure to
warn analysis is a negligence-based inquiry. As such, it differs slightly from the
manner in which failure to warn is reviewed under common law strict liability
standards. This distinction was clarified by the California Supreme Court in Brown
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059 n.4, 751 P.2d 470, 476 n.4, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 417 n.4 (1988):
The test stated in comment k is to be distinguished from strict liability for
failure to warn. Although both concepts identify failure to warn as the basis
of liability, comment k imposes liability only if the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the defect at the time the product was sold or
distributed. Under strict liability, the reason why the warning was not
issued is irrelevant, and the manufacturer is liable even if it neither knew
nor could have known of the defect about which the warning was required.
Thus, comment k, by focusing on the blameworthiness of the manufacturer,
sets forth a test which sounds in negligence, while imposition of liability for
failure to warn without regard to the reason for such failure is consistent
with strict liability since it asks only whether the product that caused injury
contained a defect.
Id. (citations omitted); see also DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229
(8th Cir. 1983) ("Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant
exercised due care in formulating and updating the warning, while under a strict
liability theory the issue is whether the lack of a proper warning made the product
unreasonably dangerous." (quoting Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir.
1980))).
150 See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199
(1980) ("[H]old[ing] a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which
it would be impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge
would make the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the product.... ."); see also Tatum
v. Schering Corp., 795 F.2d 925, 926 (1lth Cir. 1986) (recognizing that "[b]ecause
ethical drugs are considered unavoidably unsafe products, they are defective only
when not accompanied by an adequate warning" (citation omitted)); Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring unreasonably
dangerous products to carry a sufficient warning); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,
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mentary' 5' suggest that the sufficiency of a manufacturer's warn-
ings depends on whether it reflects the manufacturer's knowledge
of the risks associated with the product at the time of distribution.
This view is consistent with Gommentj of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A, which limits a manufacturer's duty to warn to
situations in which it "has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge of ... the danger."15 2  Based on this interpretation,
AIDS vaccine manufacturers should be absolved of strict liability for
failure to warn of unforeseeable risks.
In warning of foreseeable risks, manufacturers may not be
responsible for warning consumers directly due to the protections
of the "learned intermediary" doctrine. 153 If it is foreseeable,
however, that the vaccine will be administered without the interven-
tion of a physician, or if the manufacturer fails to warn properly the
physicians serving as intermediaries, the doctrine will not protect
97 N.J. 429, 453, 479 A.2d 374, 387 (1984) (imputing knowledge of "reliable
information generally available or reasonably obtainable in the industry or in the
particular field involved").
151 See, e.g., Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53
TEX. L. REv. 1375, 1395 (1975) ("Onlywhen the risk of damage becomes foreseeable,
because of an advance in the body of relevant knowledge, does a duty to warn
attach."); Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically
UndiscoverableProdutDefects, 71 GEO. LJ. 1635,1642 (1983) (arguing that courts have
retained a requirement of foreseeability of risk before manufacturers are required to
warn in § 402A cases to avoid requiring "a product manufacturer to warn of defects
that were scientifically undiscoverable at the time the product was marketed").
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A commentj (1965).
153 First adopted in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966),
the learned intermediary doctrine holds that the manufacturer satisfies its duty to
warn if makes "reasonable efforts" to warn doctors of the possibility of side effects.
See id. It is based on the rationale that
[pirescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula
and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take
into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of
his patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication
against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an
individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient
and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ultimate
purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter, in
selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing
physician, who acts as a "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and
consumer.
Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; see also Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the
Development of a Vaccine against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 957-61 (1988)
(discussing the application of the learned intermediary doctrine to AIDS vaccine
manufacturers).
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against liability.15 4 In addition, in order to remain insulated from
liability, manufacturers must warn of product risks in a manner
consistent within the industry. 155 Finally, evidence of a failure to
warn which rises to the level of "malice, wantonness, or reckless
indifference from which malice could be inferred" may support the
imposition of punitive damages on the manufacturer.
156
In summary, although the tort law fails short of completely
protecting potential vaccine manufacturers from strict liability, the
extent of their liability should be minimized by the critical need for
their products. Once a broad range of AIDS vaccines becomes
available, it is less clear, however, whether all such vaccines will
meet the unavoidably unsafe standard. More rigorous risk-utility
evaluations will occur as each successive vaccine becomes available.
Legislative intervention may be required to encourage manufactur-
ers to enter the market.
157
154 See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
Givens is particularly interesting because it points out how broad the scope of a
"proper warning" can become. The court determined that, although the manufactur-
er had not misrepresented the safety of its oral polio vaccine to the administering
physician, the product warning trivialized the risk because the physician had not felt
sufficiently compelled to disclose the one-in-three million chance of injury to his
patient. See id. at 1345.
155 See Tatur, 795 F.2d at 928 (recognizing that although the defendant had
revised its package insert in response to an FDA directive, "no letters were written to
physicians and no bulletins [were] sent to [the manufacturer's] detailmen, nor were
detailmen told to bring the matter to the attention of physicians"). The court
regarded the manufacturer's "method of calling attention to a change in warning
indicating a higher risk of serious adverse reaction than previously described" as
being "inconsistent with the practice of other drug manufacturers." Id. Note,
however, that because the standard of liability for failure to warn is negligence,
remedial changes in warning literature will be excluded under the rules of evidence.
See Deluryea v. Wintrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence "requires exclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial changes in [a manufacturer's] warning literature").
156 Deluiyea, 697 F.2d at 231 (citing Hoffman v. Sterling Drugs, 485 F.2d 132 (3d
Cir. 1973)).
157 As noted supra text accompanying notes 80-81 & 101, manufacturers will not
be immune from strict liability claims based on manufacturing defects associated with
their products. For an excellent discussion of the manner in which various liability
rules impact on the risks associated with the manufacture of pharmaceutical products,
see generally Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What
Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705
(1989-90).
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IV. FUTURE SOLUTIONS FOR AIDS VACCINE MANUFACTURERS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS AND
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Federal Legislative Efforts
Federal legislation may ultimately be used to achieve uniform
vaccine liability standards that strike a balance between the policy
objectives of adequately protecting consumers and encouraging the
manufacture of socially desirable products. Two recent pieces of
legislation may serve as models for future legislative development
at the federal level.
1. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
The federal government's most recent activity in legislative
vaccine regulation consists of the creation of the National Vaccine
Program (NVP) as mandated by the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act (NCVI). l5 8 'The stated purpose of the NCVI is "to
achieve optimal prevention of human infectious diseases through
immunization and.., optimal prevention against adverse reactions
to vaccines."159 Another program created by the NOVI is the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 160 which was
designed to provide a "no-fault" compensation scheme for those
injured by any of the vaccines required by law for entrance to public
school (vaccines for childhood infectious diseases such as iphtheria
and tetanus). Although the legislation directed that tort law would
provide a secondary remedy for the victims of vaccine-related
injuries, it stipulated that such persons must seek compensa-
tion161 through channels specified in the legislation prior to filing
158 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988).
159 Id. § 30Oaa-1.
160 See id. § 300aa-10(a).
161 The compensation scheme is funded by revenues generated from an excise tax
on vaccine sales between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1992. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4131-32 (1988). The adequacy of the compensation scheme necessarily requires
accurate estimates of the number and amount of future claims. Recognizing this, the
legislation provides for termination of awards if the anticipated amount is exceeded
in a given period. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-34 (1988). Once the federal program
becomes insolvent, civil tort claims become the only avenue of redress for victims.
See id.
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suit against the vaccine manufacturer.162  Manufacturers must
provide vaccines with warnings detailing the risks.
This program appears to have decreased the number of lawsuits
filed against manufacturers, but it is too early to know whether the
initial trend will continue.1 63 It is also unclear whether the pro-
gram can be expanded to include AIDS vaccines. Two commen-
tators take a rather pessimistic look at the potential for the NCVI to
offer protection in the AIDS context:
The inclusion of a new, elective vaccine would require acceptance
of a much broader principle of social responsibility for any
vaccine-related injury. There is also a practical obstacle to
extending the NCVI act to cover AIDS vaccines. In order to
simplify the process of determining eligibility for compensation,
the act presumes that certain injuries have been caused by the
vaccine. It will... be virtually impossible to identify... the times
of onset in order to establish a credible schedule of compensable
injuries before any AIDS vaccine is tested or distributed.
64
2. The Product Liability Reform Act
Additional federal legislative efforts may take place though the
passage of some form of a uniform products liability act.165 One
such effort, the Products Liability Reform Act, is currently under
review in the Senate.1 6 6 As it currently stands, this bill will permit
drug manufacturers to use FDA approval of a drug as an absolute
defense against punitive damages, as long as the manufacturer has
not committed fraud during the approval process. 167  However,
because the legislation does not include any provisions allowing
162 All claims are handled by the United States Claims Court. See United States
Claims Court, General Order No. 23, 16 Cl. Ct. XXI (Jan 25, 1989) (rules for claims
processing); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21 (1988). For a discussion of the policy rationale
behind Congress's decision not to eliminate redress through the tort system, see
Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injurj Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc
Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387, 395 (1987).
163 See Hinman, DTP Vaccine Litigation Update, 142 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD 1275
(1988).
164 Mariner & Gallo, supra nole 61, at 24.
165 Models for such efforts may be found in the Department of Commerce Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
166 See S. 1400, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S8,725-31 (1989); see also
S. REP. No. 356, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter REPORT]; Gastel, Product
Liability TortReforn, INS. INFO. INST., August 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, IIRPTS file).
For a justification of the legislation, see supra text accompanying note 78.
167See S. 1400, supra note 166, § 303(c), 135 CONG. REC. at S8,727; REPORT, supra
note 166, at 39.
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compliance with FDA standards to create a presumption of product
safety, 1 6 8 it is only a partial solution. Products designed to FDA
standards will still not be "liability-proof," and manufacturers have
yet to obtain a yardstick by which to predict their ultimate exposure
level. It will be interesting to see what other protections the federal
government will be willing to offer drug manufacturers, and
whether such protections will solve the liability crisis facing AIDS
vaccine manufacturers, or instead create problems of their
own.1
69
B. Applicability of the Federal Preemption Doctrine
Although it has not been successfully argued to date,170 anoth-
er theory may eventually assist vaccine manufacturers in their
attempts to define the boundaries of potential AIDS vaccine
liability: the federal preemption doctrine could limit the liability of
manufacturers sued for alleged improper vaccine design, testing,
and labeling, or for any other activities that have been sanctione4
by the FDA.
The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy
clause,17 1 and it serves to define the boundaries of power between
the federal government and the states. Federal preemption of state
law occurs when the spheres of state and federal sovereignty
intersect to the degree that the autonomy of the state, and its power
as a regulatory body must be displaced. Preemption may either be
"express, "1 2 where an activity is explicitly regulated in the lan-
guage of a federal statute or regulation, or it may be "implied," 173
168 Such statutes have been enacted at the state level. See infra note 187.
169 "'Although congressional leaders said at the time that the swine flu case would
not be a precedent for future mass immunization programs ... it may nevertheless
be a relevant precedent for an AIDS vaccine.'" Weisburd, AIDS Vaccines: The
Problems of Human Testing; 131 Scd. NEWS 329, 330-31 (1987) (quoting Richard M.
Cooper, a Washington attorney, at an NIH workshop).
17 See infra notes 184-85.
171 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme law of the Land;
and theJudges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Id.
172 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (noting Congress's ability to "pre-empt state
authority by so stating, in express terms"); see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977).
173 See generally Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985) (reviewing several types of implied preemption).
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where (1) state law directly conflicts with federal requirements;
174
(2) the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that it can be
assumed to be controlling; 75 (3) public policy rationales support
an inference of preemption;176 (4) a review of the legislative
history of a federal statute or regulation favors a finding of
preemption;177 or (5) the federal government has made a con-
scious decision that a particular activity not be regulated. 78 The
174 As the Supreme Court stated in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
248 (1984):
If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law.., or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural
Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (stating that "if Congress has not
displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent
that the state law actually conflicts with federal law").
175 This would be the case if "[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it," or "the Act of Congress ... touch[es] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or finally, if "the object sought to be
obtained by federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it... reveal the
same purpose." Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1559 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("The detail and precision with which Congress provided the means for the
enforcement of the affirmative action clause makes it reasonable to infer that
Congress left no room in section 503(b) for state contract actions to supplement it.").
176 One such policy-related goal might be the maintenance of uniformity among
the states. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S.
409, 423 (1986) (holding that state regulation of interstate pipelines "disturbs the
uniformity of the federal scheme"); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co., 450 U.S. 311, 326 (1981) ("A system under which each state could through its
courts, impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service requirements
could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contemplated by Congress in
enacting the Interstate Commerce Act."); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground:
A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 215-16 (1959) ("When federal
action is inspired by a desire to avoid multiple and conflicting state regulation.., the
context strongly suggests that the state should not be allowed to continue to govern
matters subject to federal regulation.").
177 See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). But see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481,493 (1987) ("We resort to legislative materials only when the congressional
mandate is unclear on its face." (citation omitted)).
178 See Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "where the [Federal Railroad Administration] has rejected the
requirement of strobe or oscillating [warning] lights, a state may not require them");
Bessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 430 Pa. 339,
344, 243 A.2d 358, 360 (stating that "it is no longer open to the states to decide that
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Supreme Court has recognized that federal regulations have "no less
preemptive effect than federal statutes."179 The Court has also
conceded that state common law tort claims may have regulatory
effects 180 and may also be subject to preemption, 181 although
the Court has been reluctant to recognize preemption in the fields
of health and safety.
182
In the context of AIDS vaccine regulation, the key question with
respect to preemption will be whether this doctrine can be inferred
from the extent of federal involvement 183 or the scope of federal
interests in uniform regulation or in the availability of this product.
Unfortunately, in asking courts to recognize a preemption argu-
ment, manufacturers will face a judicial environment that has not
been particularly hospitable. With a few exceptions, 184 the courts
that have addressed the preemption issue 185 appear disinclined to
federal protections are inadequate and that additional safety measures must be
taken"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 959 (1968).
179 Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153.
180 See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) ("The authority of Congress is
no less when the state power which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised
by the state judiciary rather than by the state legislature.").
181 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,247 (1959) ("The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States' salutary effort to redress
private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate
activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.").
182 See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718 ("Given the presumption that state and local
regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal
regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal
regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.").
18s Under either the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), see supra text accompa-
nyingnote 7, or the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), see supra note 10.
IM See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
Although the circuit court's decision reversed a lower court decision that had fully
embraced the preemption argument, the appeals court did recognize that with respect
to the adequacy of the product warning, the manufacturer had a compelling
argument for preemption:
It would be patently inconsistent for a state then to hold the manufacturer
liable for including that precise warning when the manufacturer would
otherwise be liable for not including it. Thus assuming that the FDA has
processed all the relevant and available information in arriving at the
prescribed warning, its decision as to the proper wording must preempt by
implication that of a state.
Id. at 1179.
185 See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (4th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the arguments that the pervasive nature of the FDCA, PHSA and NCVIA
were indicative of congressional intent to preempt and that public health policy would
be frustrated by allowing state tort claims against DPT vaccine manufacturers), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceutical, 704 F. Supp. 653, 658-
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embrace the notion that the purposes of the FDCA or the PHSA are
frustrated by permitting plaintiffs to obtain state common law tort
remedies from manufacturers. The opinions of commentators
186
seem mixed, and only a few state legislatures18 7 have specifically
considered either (1) the evidentiary weight to be given to manu-
facturers' regulatory compliance; or (2) the issue of preemption in
a product liability context.
Because the language of FDGA and PHSA do not expressly
preempt state law, manufacturers' claims for preemption have been
based on a notion that the ]pervasiveness of federal regulations and
the public interests in product availability and uniform regulation
of drug labeling support a finding of preemption. Although later
reversed, the district court decision in Hurley v. Lederle Laborato-
ries188 provides a succinct summary of the pervasiveness argument
with respect to drug labeling:
60 (D.S.C. 1988) (refusing to infer preemption from the alleged comprehensiveness
of federal regulations); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (D. Kan.
1987) (disallowing manufacturer immunity from state tort claims because although
"Congress intends vaccines to be at least as uniformly safe as the FDA regulations
require, there has never been a congressional intent that innocent victims of adverse
reactions should be precluded from being compensated or from demonstrating that
the vaccines could be even safer"); see also Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1176 n.2 (providing an
exhaustive listing of the numerous district court opinions that have found against
preemption and three state court opinions that have found for preemption).
86 See, e.g., Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-
Regulate 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 121 (1988) (favoring preemption and stating
that "federal preemption is fully warranted by the federal drug regulatory scheme
today"); Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARv. L. REV. 773, 792-93 (1990) (favoring limited preemption
and noting that "the judiciary should defer to the institutional superiority of the FDA,
and concentrate on ensuring that the FDA has arrived at a reasoned determination
based on sufficient information"); Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the
Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REV. 655, 705 (1989) (favoring preemption and arguing
that "[p]reemption of design defect claims would help to alleviate the crisis in vaccine
litigation and foster the national objective to prevent the spread of pertussis
disease."); Comment, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress Want?, 59
U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 283 (1989) (disapproving of preemption: "Blanket immunity to
drug manufacturers can work to the detriment of injured plaintiffs and has far too
serious consequences to be considered by the courts without an express indication
that such situations are acceptable to Congress.").187 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-116-105 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980) (recognizing that a manufacturer's or
supplier's compliance with governmental regulations constitutes either evidence or
a rebuttable presumption that a product is not unreasonably dangerous).
188 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
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[T]he comprehensiveness of the FDA regulation as to DPT labeling
evidence a preemptive intent to occupy the field and precludes
state regulation.
... The contents and wording of these product inserts are
extensively regulated and controlled by the FDA. Furthermore,
the language in the product insert cannot be used or changed
without prior FDA approval. Thus, the comprehensive nature of
the FDA regulations evidences preemptive intent to establish
implied preemption as to the labeling/warning of DPT in the
present case.
189
The public's interest in a uniform regulatory scheme has been
addressed on several occasions by the FDA.19 ° Concerns that
manufacturer liability for common law tort claims may have
regulatory consequences that ultimately deny consumers access to
important products have also been discussed in many contexts.
1 91
It appears that most courts, believing that the federal regulations
establish only minimum regulatory standards, 192 will reject manu-
facturers' preemption arguments. Choosing to minimize the effect
that denying preemption will have on undermining the federal
regulatory scheme, 193 they will instead focus upon their reluc-
tance to deprive injured plaintiffs of a civil remedy. 19 4  This
attitude will force AIDS vaccine manufacturers who wish to make
the preemption argument to decide whether to seek review of their
preemption claims by the Supreme Court. As this is a forum in
which the presumption against federal preemption has consistently
been recognized, manufacturers are not likely to be successful. 195
189 Id. at 999 (footnote omitted).
90 See 51 Fed. Reg. 8181 (1986) (noting that conflicting state requirements "would
interfere with the accomplishment of the FDA's objective to bring consistency and
uniformity to the marketplace"); 50 Fed. Reg. 51403 (1985) (noting that the FDA
seeks to further a "well-established policy of promoting uniformity in the area [of
drug labeling]").
91 See supra notes 78, 83 & 110 and accompanying text.
192 See Abbot 844 F.2d at 113; Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293,
1299 (D. Minn. 1988).
193 Courts have specifically downplayed the importance of maintaining uniformity
in the regulatory scheme. See Graham, 666 F. Supp. at 1493 (urging that "[u]niformity
is a goal to be achieved in the interest of more fully protecting citizens from unsafe
products-it is not to be achieved by sacrificing public health").
194 See Abbot 844 F.2d at 1112 (noting that since no federal remedy exists, the
presumption against preemption is greater); Wack v. Lederle Laboratories, 666 F.
Supp. 123, 127-28 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("The Court is also reluctant to hold implied
preemption applies to the plaintiffs' design defect, inadequate warnings and punitive
damage claims because such action would effectively deprive the plaintiffs of any civil
remedy.").195 "[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
1991] 1117
1118 UNIVERSITY OFPENNISYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1077
C. State Legislative Efforts: The California Model
In 1986, after determining that potential AIDS vaccine manufac-
turers needed incentives to bring their products to market, the
California Assembly enacted legislation that would eventually
provide assistance in both the clinical testing and the marketing
phases of vaccine development. This legislation may serve as a
model for other states hoping successfully to mobilize manufactur-
ers in the AIDS vaccine effort.
The California legislation attempted to facilitate vaccine
development in a number of ways. 1 6 First, it gave a state regula-
tory body, the Food and Drug Branch (FDB) of the California
Department of Health Services, the necessary resources to oversee
clinical testing by up to three vaccine manufacturers once approval
by either the federal FDA. or FDBI 97 had been granted. 19s Sec-
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature
of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime 373 U.S. at 142; see also supra note 182.
196 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.45(o) (West Supp. 1990).
197 See id. § 199.57(a). The legislative findings that prefaced the 1987 amend-
ments to California's AIDS programs laws are instructive in detailing the legislature's
motivation for permitting parallel state regulation of AIDS vaccine clinical trials:
(a) California has a strong interest in facilitating and expediting the clinical
testing of AIDS drugs. At the same time, California has an interest in
ensuring that such testing is performed only under carefully considered,
developed and recognized medical protocols.
(b) The State Department of Health Services already has the authority to
approve new drug applications pursuant to Section 26670 of the Health and
Safety Code and to permit investigational use of new drugs by qualified
investigators pursuant to Section 26674 of the Health and Safety Code
where the drug is manufactured and used only within the state.
(c) To facilitate and expedite the development of AIDS drugs, California
manufacturers who are developing AIDS drugs should be offered the
alternative of applying to the State Department of Health Services for
permission to conduct clinical trials and for approval of new drug
applications.
(d) The Department of Health Services has adopted the regulations of the
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to implement Sections 26670
to 26680, inclusive, of the Health and Safety Code. As much as possible,
the protocols for investigating new drugs under Section 26679 of the Health
and Safety Code shall be similar to those approved by the FDA, so that the
data acquired in such investigations may also be submitted to the FDA
under Section 505(i) of the federal Food and Drug Act (21 U.S.C. § 355(i)).
(e) It is the intent of the Legislature that the procedures in Sections 26670
to 26680, inclusive, of the Health and Safety Code be utilized to supplement
federal procedures to the maximum extent possible under federal law to
facilitate the development and testing of AIDS-related drugs and that they
MANUFACTURING AN AIDS VACCINE
ond, the statute: (1) appropriated research monies for the subsidi-
zation of AIDS clinical vaccine trials; (2) created an AIDS Vaccine
Victims Compensation Fund (the fund);199 and (3) guaranteed
that if fewer than 500,000 units of vaccine were sold, the state
would purchase the difference between the actual number sold and
500,000 units of vaccine at a maximum price of $20 per unit.
200
Although early versions of the statute specifically addressed the
issue of potential manufacturer liability, codifying a restrictive
application of comment k,2 °1 this portion of the statute has since
been repealed.202 The legislature has instead created an AIDS
Vaccine Injury Compensation Policy Review Task Force (the task
force)2 3 to study and make recommendations on the process of
compensating victims through the fund, the procedures for
operation of the fund, the method and amount of manufacturer
payment into the fund, and "the procedural relationship between a
be utilized, to the extent feasible, in cooperation with the FDA.
Id. historical and statutory notes.
198 See id. § 199.47(e).
199 Unlike the federal scheme, individuals do not have to go through the state
compensation program before seeking a remedy directly from the manufacturer.
This may prove to be problematic since individuals are not deterred from suing
manufacturers, but will instead bring their claims in the forum likely to award the
greatest compensation.
200 See id. § 199.51.
201 The standards for manufacturer liability were those set out in Kearl v. Lederle
Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 88-90, and 112-141 (discussing the restrictive application of
comment k).
202 Section 199.49 was repealed by 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1555, § 3.
203 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50(n)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 1990). The
composition of the 14 member task force is as follows:
10 members appointed by the Governor, of which two shall be from a list
provided by the California Trial Lawyers Association, one from the State
Department of Health Services, the Director of Finance, one unspecified
member, and one attorney with experience and expertise in products
liability and negligence defense work, two representing recognized groups
which represent victims of vaccine induced injuries or AIDS victims, or
both, and two representing manufacturers actively engaged in developing
an AIDS vaccine. In addition four Members of the Legislature or their
designees shall be appointed to the task force, two of which shall be
appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly and two of which shall be
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee. The chairperson of the task
force shall be appointed by the Governor from the membership of the task
force.
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potential victim's claim through the fund and a court claim made
against the manufacturer."
20 4
Given the broad spectrum of interests represented on the task
force, there is no reason to expect that any future recommendations
made to the legislature with respect to manufacturer liability will be
unduly burdensome. Presumably the broad protections established
by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court
20 5 will
guide legislative action in this area. In addition, the other guaran-
tees of this statute, in particular the provision establishing an
insured market for potential vaccine products, will certainly serve
as direct incentives for manufacturers: "By guaranteeing a mini-
mum market, California will enable manufacturers to spread their
fixed costs over a greater number of units, thus lowering the
average cost per unit.
"2 °6
It is too early to know whether the California statute will speed
development, limit manufacturer liability, and enable consumers to
have access to a beneficial vaccine, or will put California on a
collision course with the FDA. So far, the FDA has indicated that
it will accept California trial data, yet in truth, the FDA may not be
enamored of sharing responsibility with the states. In describing
the FDA's position on the aggressive approach by California, one
FDA employee noted that "sponsors would suffer, perhaps, from not
having FDA input at an earlier stage."20 7  Another noted that
"[t]here is a point to be gained through a more coordinated
approach to the entire effort." 20 8 Although it does not appear
that the FDA is overly enthusiastic about working with the states in
their vaccine efforts,20 9 it is heartening to see that concern over
204 Id. § 199.50(n)(4).
205 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412; see also supra notes 102-110
and accompanying text.
206 Comment, supra note 153, at 963.
207 Okie, California Seizes Initiative in Drug Testing; State's Aggressive Approach to
Trials of AIDS Vaccines Has FDA Looking Over Its Shoulder, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1990,
at A21, col. 1 (quotingJanet Woodcock, director of the FDA division that approves
studies of AIDS vaccines).
208 Id. (quoting Wayne Koff, chief of the vaccine research development branch at
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases).
209 The FDA is not alone in voicing lukewarm enthusiasm for special legislative
efforts to improve prospects for an AIDS vaccine. At least two commentators have
criticized such efforts on ethical grounds. See Mariner & Gallo, supra note 61, at 24
("Is it fair to limit the liability of those who produce AIDS vaccines when manufactur-
ers of other products are not protected? Is it fair to help those injured by AIDS
vaccines when those with the disease itself receive no special help?").
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the AIDS crisis has been persuasive enough to encourage attempts
at improving the prospects for a vaccine.
CONCLUSION
The eventual success of efforts to develop an AIDS vaccine will
require greater awareness by investigators of the problems associat-
ed with the use of human subjects in clinical testing. These
problems are made all the more significant by the immense public
pressure for progress on AIDS research-pressure that may give rise
to human exploitation in the rush to bring a vaccine to the
marketplace. Successful vaccine development may also require
legislative intervention or greater judicial protection to ensure that
the marketplace remains hospitable to manufacturers.
A united effort must be made by manufacturers, regulators, and
other interested parties to streamline the process of vaccine
development so that a safe and effective product can reach the
marketplace quickly.
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